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1. Introduction 
During periods of macroeconomic and political uncertainty, many developing 
countries experience a partial replacement of the domestic currency by a foreign 
currency either as store of value, unit of account or means of payment. The latter case 
is usually referred to as “Currency Substitution”. Currency Substitution is a demand 
driven process that results from means of payment substitutability (though it is not 
necessarily implied by it) and shall be distinguished from the broader concept of 
“Asset Substitution” (or “Dollarisation”), which refers to the switching from 
(monetary and non-monetary) assets denominated in domestic currency to (monetary 
and non-monetary) assets denominated in foreign currency1.  
This paper examines the implications of imperfect means of payment 
substitutability on the properties of the money demand, using a stochastic dynamic 
optimising model in which the specific role of money is explicitly accounted for. In 
particular, it is assumed that money reduces the frictional losses from transacting in 
the goods market. This feature of the model is essential to distinguish the 
phenomenon of Currency Substitution (CS) from Asset Substitution (AS). This paper 
compares two alternative assumptions concerning capital mobility: first, the case in 
which the consumer has unrestricted access to nominally riskless bonds denominated 
in foreign currency and then the case in which the consumer faces a binding 
restriction on foreign bond holdings. In both cases, the individual is allowed to hold 
an interest-bearing asset denominated in domestic currency paying a certain nominal 
return.  
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The first case draws on Thomas (1985). This author demonstrated that 
borrowing and lending opportunities separate CS decisions from AS decisions. Since 
money bears the same characteristics as (same currency) bonds and earns a lower 
return, it should not be held in the portfolio for the speculative and risk-
diversification reasons that underlie the demand for financial assets in general 
(Thomas, 1985, pp 354: “in a model with a complete set of nominally riskless bonds 
there is no demand for money as a portfolio asset”). In this context, domestic and 
foreign money holdings are selected solely to satisfy transaction needs. The optimal 
denomination structure of the overall portfolio (AS), in turn, shall reflect a balance 
between expected returns and currency risk. Through borrowing and lending, the 
individual is able to achieve the optimal level of AS, independently of his choice 
among monetary assets (CS).  
Thomas’ separation result depends critically on the assumption that bond 
markets are complete. As pointed out by Cuddington (1989), such an assumption may 
not be suitable to describe the demand for money in countries with imperfect capital 
mobility. The contribution of this paper is to extend the Thomas (1985) model to the 
case in which the consumer has restricted or no access to bonds denominated in 
foreign currency. This is the appropriate set-up to describe the demand for money in 
economies subject to capital controls or in economies where openness of capital 
markets has not reached a significant part of the population.  
The implication of introducing a binding constraint on foreign bond holdings is 
that foreign money assumes a store of value role, in addition to its eventual means of 
payment role. The double role that foreign money balances may have under asset 
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holding constraints and CS is formally described in this paper. We show that if the 
domestic and foreign monies are substitutes as means of payment, then the demand 
for domestic money will be influenced by speculative and risk-hedging decisions. 
This is not to say that domestic money will be demanded as a “portfolio asset”: since 
domestic money is dominated by an interest-bearing asset, its demand will be driven 
by transactions purposes only. Means of payment substitutability, however, opens a 
channel through which the optimal choice between assets denominated in different 
currencies impacts on the liquidity value of the domestic money. In this context, 
separation of CS decisions and AS decisions no longer holds.  
The money demand properties in this model are, thus, different from those 
postulated by the Portfolio Balance Approach to Currency Substitution (Cuddington, 
1983). In light of that theory, money is viewed as a simple asset, that is gross 
substitute of all other available assets. In a context where foreign money and foreign 
bonds are both available, this leads to a demand for domestic money that depends 
negatively on the expected exchange rate depreciation by two different channels: 
substitution vis-à-vis the foreign money (currency substitution) and substitution vis-à-
vis the foreign bond (capital flight). For this reason, followers of the Portfolio 
Balance Approach have argued that the significance of an expected exchange rate 
depreciation term in the demand for domestic money does not provide a valid test for 
the presence of CS. In contrast to that theory, the model explored in this paper allows 
domestic and foreign monies to be substitutes for transactions, while their relevance 
as store of value depends on the availability of like-denominated bonds. We show 
that only in the case where the two monies are substitutes as means of payment will 
the demand for domestic money depart from the closed economy specification. 
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Moreover, our results give support to the procedure of testing for the presence of CS 
by assessing the significance of an expected exchange rate depreciation term in the 
demand for domestic money.  
A well-known limitation in the empirical analysis of CS is that data on foreign 
banknotes held by the public are not easily available. For this reason, many authors 
have proxied the demand for foreign money by the amount of foreign currency 
deposits held by residents in the banking system. Other authors have developed 
methodologies to estimate the amount of foreign money held by the public. This 
includes estimates based on the currency denomination of loans, on postulated money 
velocities or on reports of shipments of dollar bank notes from the U.S. to these 
countries (see Krueger and Ha, 1996, for a survey). Irrespective of the quality of 
these measures, they all face a fundamental limitation: wherever capital markets are 
not well developed and there is nominal instability, the demand for foreign money 
may mostly reflect a store of value motive. Thus, even if an accurate estimate of the 
demand for foreign money was available, this would tell us nothing of the extent to 
which foreign money was replacing domestic money as vehicle for transactions. If, 
according to our results, the presence of CS can be assessed estimating a demand 
function for domestic money, then this limitation is circumvented.  
This paper focuses on the particular case of “asymmetric” CS, in which a local 
currency is replaced by a foreign currency as vehicle for transactions in the domestic 
economy. This case shall be distinguished from "international CS", which refers to 
the competition among international currencies in the global economy (for the 
functions of international currencies, see Krugman, 1984). This model shares with 
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Thomas (1985) the fact that only imperfect means of payment substitutability is 
allowed for2. The implications of perfect means of payment substitutability are 
discussed in Kareken and Wallace (1981), for the case in which agents face no 
binding restrictions on money holdings, and in Lebre de Freitas (2004), for the 
“asymmetric” case in which foreign residents cannot hold domestic money. Models 
postulating imperfect substitutability in the provision of transaction services include 
Agénor and Khan (1996), Rogers (1990) and Végh (1989). Since these models 
assume away uncertainty, however, they cannot describe the speculative and risk 
hedging considerations that drive the demand for foreign money in high inflation 
countries. Imrohoroglu (1994) and Smith (1995) extend the analysis to a stochastic 
framework, but they do not explore the properties of the money demand under asset 
market restrictions. Sahay and Végh (1996) refer to the Thomas (1985) model to 
describe a case in which individuals have no access to bonds denominated in foreign 
currency. However, in their framework, individuals are allowed to hold interest 
bearing foreign currency deposits, which play the role of the missing bond in the 
model. Hence, their analysis does not depart from the original Thomas (1985) model. 
A recent debate on the empirical implications of different institutional set-ups 
concerning the availability of assets denominated in foreign currency may be seen in 
Whited (2004) and Alami (2004). However, these authors follow the aggregative 
tradition of postulating money demand functions that depend on income and 
opportunity costs, rather than deriving the money demand properties from individual 
optimisation.  
The paper proceeds as follows: The basic model is presented in Section 2. The 
money demand properties under imperfect means of payment substitutability and 
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complete bond markets are discussed in Section 3. The case in which the consumer 
faces a binding constraint on foreign bond holdings is examined in Section 4. The 
empirical implications of the results obtained are addressed in Section 5. In Section 6, 
money-demand functions for six Latin American countries are estimated for a period 
during which they imposed restrictions on capital flows, and one checks whether or 
not there is empirical support for currency substitution in each country. The 
conclusions are presented in Section 7.  
2. The model  
Consider an infinitely lived consumer, living in a small open economy. There is 
only one (non-storable) consumption good, with domestic price equal to P. The 
consumer is endowed with a constant flow of the good, denoted by y. She maximises 
the expected value of a discounted sum of instantaneous utility functions of the form:  
dt
c
e
o
tt∫∞ −− −Ε φ
φ
β
1
1
, (1) 
where ct denotes real consumption at time t, β is a positive and constant subjective 
discount rate, and 0>φ  is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.  
The individual has unrestricted access to domestic money (called peso, M), 
foreign money (dollar, F) and bonds denominated in domestic currency (A). Bonds 
denominated in foreign currency (B) may or may not be freely available, depending 
on the institutional framework under consideration. In Section 3, we discuss the 
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unrestricted case. The case with restrictions on bond availability is discussed in 
Section 4. The individual's real wealth is defined as3: 
bafmw +++= , (2) 
where PMm = , PEFf = , PAa = , PEBb = , P is the domestic price level, and 
E is the price of the dollar in peso-units.  
Domestic and foreign bonds have certain nominal returns, represented by i and 
j, respectively. Money holdings earn zero nominal returns. There is uncertainty 
concerning the inflation rate and, hence, on real returns. The consumer takes the 
inflation rate as given, because individually she cannot influence the price level. She 
may, however, perceive the price level and the exchange rate to be correlated. To 
capture this, it is assumed that the domestic price level and the exchange rate evolve 
stochastically, according to4:  
dZdt
P
dP σπ += ,  (3) 
and  
dXdt
E
dE γε += , (4) 
where dZ and dX are standard Wiener processes with instantaneous correlation equal 
to r. Denoting the covariance between the stochastic processes (3) and (4) as 
rσγρ = , and using Ito's lemma, the real returns to domestic bonds, domestic money, 
foreign bonds and foreign money are obtained:  
( ) dZdti
a
da σπσ −−+= 2 , (5) 
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( ) dZdt
m
dm σπσ −−= 2  , (6) 
( ) dXdZdtj
b
db γσρπσε +−−−++= 2 , (7) 
( ) dXdZdt
f
df γσρπσε +−−−+= 2 . (8) 
Money is distinguished from bonds in that it provides liquidity services. We 
assume that money reduces frictional losses from transacting in the goods markets5. 
Purchases of the consumption good are subject to a transaction cost (τ), that depends 
positively on the real consumption level (c) and negatively on the amount of real 
money balances. To allow for CS, it is assumed that both the domestic money and the 
foreign money serve as means of payment. For simplicity, we will refer to a particular 
transactions technology, introduced by Végh (1989): 
Assumption 1. (The transactions technology): τ(.)  is a non-negative, twice 
continuously differentiable and convex function of the form:   
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
c
f
c
mcv ,τ , (9) 
with 0(.) >v , 01 <v , 02 <v , 011 >v , 022 >v , 012 ≥v  and 02122211 >−=Δ vvv . 
In (9), τ  refers to the amount of real resources spent in transacting, and a 
subscript k (k=1,2) to the function v(.) denotes partial differentiation with respect to 
the k argument. Linear homogeneity and the assumption that additional real money 
balances (either domestic or foreign) bring about diminishing reductions in 
transaction costs are not necessary for the main propositions to hold, but help, 
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respectively, to simplify the algebra and to assure well behaved money demand 
functions6.  
The fact that foreign money provides liquidity services does not necessarily 
imply means of payment substitutability. Suppose, for example, that some fraction of 
the consumption bundle is purchased using pesos only, and that the remaining 
fraction is purchased using dollars only. In this case, there is no substitutability. 
Means of payment substitutability occurs when some fraction of the consumption 
bundle can be purchased with money denominated in either currency. In that case, 
one might expect the effect on transaction costs of increasing the holdings of one 
money to depend negatively on the holdings of the other money. Formally, this can 
be stated in the following way:  
Definition 1. (Means of payment substitutability): the domestic and foreign 
monies are said to be substitutes as means of payment if the cross derivative 12v  in 
equation (9) is strictly positive.  
The consumer’s flow budget constraint depends on the amount of saved wealth 
allocated to the available assets and on real returns:  
( )[ ]dtcydbdadfdmdw .τ−−++++= . (10) 
Using (2), (9) and (5)-(8), the flow budget constraint becomes:  
( ) dZwdXfbdtdw σγ −++Φ= , (11) 
with =Φ  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )[ ].1)( 2
222
vcybj
bfmwifm
+−+−−+++
−−−−++−−++−=
ρπσε
πσρπσεπσ
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The consumer problem is to maximise (1), subject to the stochastic 
differential (11). To account for restrictions on foreign bond holdings, we formulate 
the problem assuming that b is confined to the following control set:  
0≥− bb  (12) 
This constraint will be assumed to be binding or not, depending on the 
institutional framework under consideration. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation 
of the corresponding quasi-stationary problem is:  
( ) ( )[ ]
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−+++Φ+−=
−
≤
ρσσγφβ
φ
fbwwfbwVwVcwV
bbfmc
2)(''
2
1)('
1
max)( 2222
1
,,,
  
where Φ is defined as in (11) and V(w) is the optimal value function. The first order 
conditions in respect to b, f and m may be stated in the following way:  
[ ] ( )[ ] 0)´´()(' 2 =−−+++−− λργρε wfbwVjiwV  (13) 
[ ] ( )[ ] 0)´´()(' 22 =−++−−− ργρε wfbwVviwV  (14) 
0,1 =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
c
f
c
mvi , (15) 
where 0≥λ  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the constraint (12). Condition 
(13) accounts for both interior solutions and a boundary solution for b: according to 
the Khun-Tucker complementary slackness conditions, if the constraint (12) is not 
binding, then λ=0. If, instead, constraint (12) is binding, then λ>0 , meaning that 
lessening the constraint would have a positive impact on the optimal value function. 
These two cases are discussed in the following sections.  
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3. The case with complete bond markets (Thomas, 1985) 
In this section, we examine the case in which foreign bonds are freely available. 
In terms of the formulation above, this case is accounted for by postulating a large 
enough value for b , so as to ensure that restriction (12) is not binding. Substituting 
λ=0  in (13) and subtracting from (14), one obtains:  
0,2 =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
c
f
c
mvj . (16) 
Using )(')('' wVwwV−=φ  in (13) with λ=0  and rearranging, one obtains:  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=+ 22 111 γ
ρ
φγ
ε
φ
ij
w
fb ,  (17) 
Equation (17) is the well known optimal portfolio rule in a world with two 
assets (see Branson and Henderson, 1985, for a survey). It states that the optimal 
share of assets denominated in foreign currency (that is, the optimal level of AS), is a 
weighted average of two terms, the weights depending on the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion, φ. The first term is the speculative component. The second term is the 
hedging component. The term 2γρ gives the proportion of assets denominated in 
dollars (bonds plus money) that minimises the portfolio's purchasing power risk. 
According to (17), the consumer is induced to move away from the minimum risk 
portfolio by the expected return differential, and the extent to which she moves 
depends on her degree of  risk aversion.  
Equations (15) and (16) implicitly define the money demand functions. They 
state that the consumer should hold each money until the marginal peso (dollar) 
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produces additional transaction services equal in value to its user cost7. To investigate 
the properties of money demands, we take differences in (15)-(16):  
dc
c
fv
c
mvdf
c
vdm
c
vdi ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++−−= 2122111211 , 
dc
c
fv
c
mvdf
c
vdm
c
vdj ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++−−= 2222212221 . 
Solving for dm and df, and computing the partial derivatives, the following 
properties are obtained8:  
( )jicLm m ,= , with 022 <Δ−=
cvLmi  and 012 ≥Δ=
cvLmj , (18) 
( )jicLf f ,= , with 021 ≥Δ=
cvLfi  and 011 <Δ−=
cvLfj . (19) 
A particular case occurs when there is no means of payment substitutability 
( 012 =v ). In that case, the system simplifies to:  
( )icLm m= ,  with 0
11
<−=
v
cLmi  (18a) 
( )jcLf f= , with 0
22
<−=
v
cLfj . (19a) 
To interpret, we consider two comparative static examples under alternative 
assumptions concerning the verification of means of payment substitutability:  
Experiment 1. A rise in the expected exchange rate depreciation not imbedded 
in the interest rates (dε>0, di=dj=0).  
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According to (17), this causes an increase in the optimal proportion of assets 
(money and bonds) denominated in foreign currency (AS), for speculative reasons. 
Since the user costs of domestic and foreign money remain constant, however, this 
change does not impact on individual money demands. This result holds 
irrespectively of whether the two monies compete in the same commodity domain 
( 012 >v ) or not ( 012 =v ).  
Experiment 2. A rise in expected exchange rate depreciation accompanied by a 
domestic interest rate rise, so that the expected return differential remains unchanged 
(dε= di >0, dj=0).  
According to equation (17), in this case the optimal proportion of assets 
denominated in foreign currency (AS) remains unchanged. However, since the user 
cost of the domestic money rises, the consumer will optimally reduce its demand for 
domestic money. The remaining effects depend on whether there is means of payment 
substitutability or not: in case 012 =v , then the adjustment involves only domestic 
assets. In order to keep the denomination structure of the portfolio (AS) unchanged, 
the decline in domestic money holdings is built up through purchases of domestic 
bonds. The demand for domestic money (18a) is the same as in a closed economy9. If 
instead 012 >v , then, as the demand for domestic money declines, the marginal 
contribution of foreign money to the reduction of transactions costs ( 2v− ) rises. 
According to (16), this leads to an increase in the demand for foreign money, for 
transaction purposes. In order to keep the currency composition of the overall 
portfolio unchanged, the consumer offsets the move by selling dollar-denominated 
bonds. In this case, there is CS but the level of AS remains unchanged.  
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These experiments illustrate the Thomas (1985) separation result: on the one 
hand, the consumer selects his currency holdings, based on each money's transaction 
services and associated user cost. On the other hand, she borrows or lends to achieve 
the desired level of AS. An optimal currency hedge is created and the denomination 
structure of the individual portfolio is independent of money holdings.  
4. The case with a binding constraint on foreign bond holdings  
We now assume that constraint (12) is binding. Subtracting (13) from (14) with 
λ>0, one obtains:  
0,2 >⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
c
f
c
mvj  (16a) 
Comparing to (16), equation (16a) reveals that, in this case, the consumer holds 
a higher amount of foreign money than if there was no restriction on foreign bond 
holdings. This captures the substitution of foreign bonds by foreign money as store of 
value device10. In this case, the following proposition holds:  
Proposition 1 (foreign money as a portfolio asset). If the consumer faces a 
binding restriction on foreign bond holdings, then the optimal denomination structure 
of the portfolio is given by: 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=+ 222 111 γ
ε
φγ
ρ
φ
iv
w
bf  (17a) 
Proof: Substitute the boundary solution bb =  in (14), use 
)(')('' wVwwV−=φ  and rearrange to obtain equation (17a).  
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Equation (17a) describes the optimal level of AS. As in (17), the consumer is 
induced to move away from the minimum risk portfolio by the expected return 
differential and the extent to which she moves depends on her degree of risk aversion, 
φ. The novelty here is that the marginal reduction in transaction costs due to foreign 
money holdings ( 02 <v ) replaces j as the relevant return from foreign denominated 
assets used in the assessment of the expected return differential. Equation (17a) 
captures the double role that foreign money may have in high inflation countries 
where foreign bonds are not freely available: as long as foreign money has a 
transactions role, this is no longer separable from the store of value role11.   
The following implication is straightforward:  
Corollary 1 (domestic money demand influenced by AS decisions). Under the 
conditions of Proposition 1, if the domestic money and the foreign money are 
substitutes as means of payment, then the demand for domestic currency will be 
influenced by speculative and risk-hedging considerations.   
The intuition underlying Corollary 1 is simple: if the amount of foreign money 
holdings affects the liquidity value of the domestic money, then any change in the 
demand for foreign money for store of value reasons will impact on the demand for 
domestic money, even if the later is dominated by an interest-bearing asset.  
To illustrate, we solve the system (17a)-(15) for m and f, using the transactions 
technology  (9). Proceeding as before, the following properties are obtained:  
( )γε ,,icLm m= ,   
 17
 
with 
( )
0
2
1222 ><Ω
+−= φγcvvwLmi , 012 ≤Ω=
wv
Lmε  and 
( )
02 12 ≥Ω
−−−= vmawLm γφγ ,  (18b) 
( )γε ,,icLf f= ,  
with ( ) 02111 ><Ω
−= vvwLfi , 011 >Ω
−= wvLfε  and ( ) 02 11 <Ω
−−= vmawLf γφγ ,  (19b) 
where 0211 <−Δ−=Ω φγvcw .  
In the particular case in which the two currencies are not substitutes as means 
of payment ( 012 =v ), the demand for domestic money simplifies to the closed 
economy specification, (18a). The demand for foreign money becomes such that 
0<−= ffi LL ε . 
To interpret, consider the following comparative static examples, under 
alternative assumptions concerning the verification of means of payment 
substitutability.  
Experiment 1. A rise in the expected exchange rate depreciation not imbedded 
in the domestic interest rate (dε>0, di=0).  
From (17a), this induces a move from domestic bonds to foreign money 
balances for speculative reasons. As long as foreign money provides transaction 
services ( 02 <v ), the consumer will face a decline in transaction costs. The 
remaining effects depend on whether there is means of payment substitutability or 
not: if 012 =v , then these developments do not impact on the demand for domestic 
money. In this case, the higher demand for foreign money reflects AS but not CS. If , 
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however, 012 >v , then the increased holdings of foreign money impact negatively on 
the marginal contribution of domestic money to the reduction of transactions costs. 
Thus, the demand for domestic money declines, as it is replaced by foreign money in 
transactions. This second case illustrates how a pure speculative movement, rising the 
demand for foreign money, is transmitted, through CS, to the demand for domestic 
money.  
Experiment 2. A rise in expected exchange rate depreciation embedded in the 
domestic interest rate (dε= di >0).  
From (17a), the optimal proportion of assets denominated in each currency does 
not change for pure speculative reasons. However, from (15), the rise in the user cost 
of the domestic money leads agents to reduce its demand. This, in turn, may or may 
not impact on the level of AS: in case 012 =v , then the decline in the demand for 
domestic money is built through purchases of domestic bonds only (just as in a closed 
economy). In this case, the demand for foreign money remains unchanged and so will 
the level of AS. If, however, 012 >v , then the decline in domestic money holdings 
impacts positively on the marginal productivity of foreign money to the reduction of 
transactions costs so that its demand rises for transaction purposes. This is a pure CS 
effect that, notwithstanding, goes along with the level of AS.  
It is important to observe that the signs of the partial derivatives with respect to 
the domestic interest rate in (18b) and (19b) are uncertain. To understand this, 
consider a third experiment, in which the domestic interest rate rises alone:  
Experiment 3. A rise in the domestic interest rate not accompanied by the 
expected exchange rate depreciation (di>0, dε=0).  
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From (17a), this induces a move from foreign money balances to domestic 
bonds for speculative reasons. On the other hand, from (15), the rise in the user cost 
of the domestic money leads agents to reduce its demand. Then: if 012 =v , there are 
no transmission effects from one money market to the other. In this case, both the 
decline in the demand for domestic money and the move out of foreign money 
balances are built through purchases of domestic bonds only (note that, with 012 =v , 
m
iL and 
f
iL  are unequivocally negative). If 012 >v , then the fall in the demand for 
money in each denomination impacts positively on the marginal productivity of the 
other money, inducing offsetting CS effects, through which both money demands 
rise. To obtain negative elasticities ( 0<miL and 0<fiL ), it is sufficient to assume that 
own effects dominate over CS effects (that is 12vvkk > , with k=1,2). Other results are 
however consistent with 0>Δ , in equation (9). For example, with 111222 vvv >> , one 
would obtain 0>miL  and 0<fiL .  
5. Implications for empirical work  
In the empirical literature on CS, some authors have investigated the presence 
of CS by evaluating the statistical significance of a term capturing the expected 
exchange rate depreciation in the demand for domestic money (Fasano-Filho, 1987, 
Kamin and Ericsson, 2003). Such procedure was criticised by Cuddington (1983), in 
the context of the Portfolio Balance Approach to CS. This approach treats money as a 
simple asset without specifying any particular feature so as to make it distinguishable 
from the other assets. Postulating gross substitutability between money and all other 
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assets, this leads to money demand functions that depend positively on income and 
wealth and negatively on the return of each alternative asset. When the available 
assets are: domestic money, foreign money, domestic bonds and foreign bonds, the 
following functional form has been proposed:   
( ) εαεαααα 43210 loglog +++++=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ jiy
P
M ,  (20) 
with α1>0, α2<0, α3<0 and α4<0. The term α3 captures substitutability between the 
domestic money and the foreign bond, and the term α4  captures substitutability 
between the domestic money and the foreign money. Since the demand for domestic 
money depends negatively on the expected exchange rate depreciation, both through 
substitutability vis-à-vis the foreign money and substitutability vis-à-vis the foreign 
bond, followers of the PBM have claimed that CS and capital mobility are 
statistically indistinguishable. Moreover, in light of that approach, it has been argued 
that the specification of a CS motive in the money demand does not constitute a 
qualitative difference relative to a specification where either CS is ruled out or where 
foreign monetary and non-monetary assets are implicitly lumped together 
(Cuddington, 1983).  
The Portfolio Balance Approach has two main shortcomings. First, as noted by 
Branson and Henderson (1985), gross substitutability is not always consistent with 
individual optimisation. Second, the model does not explain why money is held when 
dominated by interest-bearing assets. A closer scrutiny of the properties of the money 
demand in light of firmer microeconomic foundations was made by Thomas (1985), 
for the case with complete bond markets. As shown in Section 3, in this case, there is 
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no demand for money as a “portfolio asset”. From equations (18) and (18a), a 
possible specification to test for the presence of CS in this context is to investigate the 
sign and the significance of  β3  in:  
jiy
P
M
3210 loglog ββββ +++=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛  (21) 
where β1>0, β2<0 and β3>0.  
The Thomas model shall be seen as the centrepiece to test the CS hypothesis in 
countries with developed financial markets. Not surprisingly, this model has been 
used to test the presence of currency substitution among major currencies (Bergstrand 
and Bundt, 1990, Mizen and Pentecost, 1994, Lebre de Freitas, 2006). Sahay and 
Végh (1996) used the same model to discuss the case of high inflation countries 
where bank deposits denominated in foreign currency are available, playing the role 
of the missing bond. The Thomas model is less suitable, however, to describe the 
phenomenon of CS in countries where consumers have no free access to interest-
bearing foreign assets. As pointed out by Cuddington (1989), in that case, one expects 
the demand for foreign money to have a store of value role in addition to the eventual 
means of payment role.  
The results obtained in Section 4 give support to the Cuddington (1989, pp. 
269) claim that, when foreign bonds are not freely available, the demand for foreign 
money should reflect “a portfolio component”. They also imply that, in case the two 
monies are substitutes as means of payment, the demand for domestic money will be 
influenced by AS decisions. However, our findings do not give support to an 
empirical test based on equation (20). Alternatively, equation (18b) suggests that a 
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valid test for the presence of CS in countries with imperfect capital mobility is to 
access the sign and the significance of δ3  and δ4 in:  
γδεδδδδ 43210 loglog ++++=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ iy
P
M . (22) 
where δ1>0, δ2 ><0, δ3<0 and δ4>0. Note that a similar exercise based on the 
demand for foreign money (19b) does not necessarily reveal the presence of CS.  
It may be argued that, under uncovered interest rate parity, the choice of the 
particular model to be estimated is less relevant. This does not change, however, the 
main result of this paper: irrespective of the degree of capital mobility, only in case of 
CS will the demand for domestic money depart from the closed economy 
specification (18a). Thus, the CS hypothesis may be investigated, without ambiguity 
regarding the identification of the relevant effect.  
6. Empirical application  
In this section, an empirical test based on the theoretical model presented above 
is implemented for six Latin American countries that experimented with restrictions 
on capital flows for long periods of time. The focus on Latin America is motivated by 
extensive background work reporting the presence of CS in the region (see, for 
example, Calvo and Végh 1992, Guidotti and Rodriguez 1992, Savastano 1996, and 
Kamin and Ericsson 2003) and also because of data availability12.  
The departure point for the construction of the sample is the data on “unofficial 
dollarisation”, collected by Feige, et al. (2003). These authors computed a “Currency 
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Substitution Index”, defined as the proportion of monetary assets outside banks that is 
denominated in foreign currency. The estimates are based on reported shipments of 
monetary assets denominated in U.S. dollars from the U.S. to different destinations. 
The authors also computed an “Asset Substitution Index”, given by the ratio of 
residents’ bank deposits denominated in foreign currency to total bank deposits. 
Figure 1 shows the corresponding figures for 1997/98 for thirteen Latin American 
countries.  
-- Insert Figure 1 about here -- 
It should be noted that none of these measures corresponds to our definitions of 
CS and AS. On the one hand, as long as foreign money may be held for store of value 
reasons, the first measure does not necessarily indicate the extent to which it is 
replacing domestic money as a vehicle for transactions. On the other hand, the 
proposed index of AS does not measure the proportion of assets that are denominated 
in foreign currency. Still, the latter may be suggestive of the extent to which foreign 
banknotes are dominated by interest-bearing assets. Since our aim is to test for CS in 
a context where foreign bank notes have a significant store of value role, our sample 
is restricted to those countries in Figure 1 with a zero or very low “Asset Substitution 
Index”. These are: Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay and 
Venezuela (Panama is not included because it is officially dollarised). To this group, 
we add Chile because this country had high inflation rates in the 1970s and 1980s, 
applied capital controls for a long period of time, and had relatively low financial 
dollarization.13 
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In order to restrict the analysis to periods with high restrictions on capital flows, 
we use Quinn’s (1997) 0 to 4 measure of capital controls’ intensity and also the IMF 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAR), 
which are reported in Table 1 for the six countries under study. According to the 
table, with the exception of Venezuela, all countries in this sample had capital 
controls in place for around 30 years. Using quarterly data, this allows for a very 
reasonable number of observations. Because of data availability, the sample period 
starts in 1970, except for Chile, for which interest rate data is available only after 
1977, and for Venezuela, which applied capital/exchange controls only after 198414.   
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
The model to be estimated does not impose a priori the functional form (22). It 
is instead general enough to account also for models (20) and (21). With this 
procedure we allow the data to select the appropriate model. In order to account for 
eventual non-stationarity of real money15 and of independent variables, we employ 
the Stock and Watson (1993) Dynamic OLS methodology, according to which one 
regresses the dependent variable with the contemporaneous levels of the explanatory 
variables, leads and lags of their first differences, and a constant. Since real money is 
not seasonally adjusted, we also include quarterly dummy variables. Finally, the first 
lag of real money is included to account for autocorrelation. The equation to be 
estimated is the following 16: 
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where M/P is real money (Money, IMF-IFS, line 34, divided by the CPI, IMF-IFS, 
line 64), Y is real GDP (nominal GDP, IMF-IFS, line 98B, divided by the CPI, IMF-
IFS, line 64), i is the domestic interest rate (IMF-IFS, line 60B, 60L or 60 – according 
to availability), j is the U.S. treasury bill rate (IMF-IFS, line 60c), ε is the one quarter 
ahead expected exchange rate depreciation (for which we use three alternative 
proxies as explained below), γ is the standard deviation of the exchange rate (IMF-
IFS, line RF) computed over the last one to three years, depending on which 
maximizes the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), qi are the quarterly 
dummy variables and u is the error term17. Although we start with a model that 
includes all leads and lags of the explanatory variables up to order 3, the SBIC is used 
to obtain a more parsimonious model. 
Three alternative proxies for the one quarter ahead expected exchange rate 
depreciation are tested: the inflation differential relative to the United States (based 
on the relative version of the Purchasing Power Parity), the current quarter 
depreciation rate (“myopic” expectations) and a forecast based on information 
available at the time expectations were formed (rational expectations). The last case 
is estimated using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), with the choice of the 
instruments for the expected exchange rate depreciation driven by the results of the 
first stage estimations18. 
 Table 2 shows the estimation results for each one of the six countries selected, 
using the three alternative proxies for the expected exchange rate depreciation. In 
general, the coefficients on GDP and on the domestic interest rate are statistically 
significant, and with the conventional signs. As expected in a sample restricted to 
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periods with capital controls, the US Treasury Bill rate is seldom statistically 
significant. The only exception is Paraguay, for which it has the wrong sign. 
-- Insert Table 2 about here -- 
As far as the verification of the CS hypothesis is concerned, the results point to 
two distinct cases: firstly, in Brazil and Chile, no other variable apart from those 
appearing in a standard (closed economy) specification of the money demand was 
found to be statistically significant. According to our theoretical model, this is 
suggestive of absence of CS. Secondly, in Colombia, the Dominican Republic and 
Venezuela, both the expected depreciation term and the volatility term are in general 
statistically significant and with the respective signs according to model (22) (in the 
case of the Dominican Republic, results for the 2SLS are less conclusive, but 
probably this is due to misspecification of the forecasting model). This is suggestive 
of the presence of CS. The case of Paraguay reveals some ambiguity, because the 
exchange rate depreciation is statistically significant in one equation but no other 
result points to CS (also note that the estimated coefficient for the Treasury Bill rate 
has the wrong sign).19  
The findings for Brazil and Chile are consistent with the general assertion that 
these two countries have been an exception in the context of Latin America: despite 
the several episodes of high inflation in these two countries, it appears that they did 
not translate into a significant replacement of their respective monies by the U.S. 
Dollar as vehicle for transactions (see, for example, Savastano 1996, p. 225). For the 
remaining countries, one would like to confront the results with an effective measure 
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of the extent to which foreign money has been used as means of payment. To the best 
of our knowledge, however, no such measure exists.  
Comparing the estimation results with the data displayed in Figure 1, we 
observe that the countries with higher “Currency Substitution Index” are those for 
which evidence of CS was found. Obviously, this does not validate the procedure of 
assessing the extent of CS by estimating the stock of foreign money balances held by 
the public. But it is consistent with the view that CS is more likely when a 
considerable demand for foreign money as store of value already exists (this pattern 
is suggested, for example, in Calvo and Végh, 1992). In light of that interpretation, in 
Brazil and Chile, where indexed bonds denominated in domestic currency became 
popular, the demand for foreign money as store of value never reached such a critical 
level so as to induce its acceptability as means of payment20.  
7. Conclusions 
This paper extends the Thomas (1985) dynamic optimising model of money 
demand and currency substitution to the case in which the individual faces a binding 
restriction on foreign bond holdings. In this case, foreign bank notes may have a store 
of value role in addition to the eventual means of payment role. We show that means 
of payment substitutability acts as a channel through which risk-hedging and 
speculative decisions involving the demand for foreign money impact on the demand 
for domestic money. Moreover, we show that only in case of currency substitution 
will the demand for domestic money depart from the closed economy specification. 
The results contradict Cuddington (1983, 1989)’s influential claim that the 
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significance of an expected depreciation term in the demand for domestic money does 
not provide a valid test for the presence of CS. This implication is convenient for 
empirical purposes: if the CS hypothesis can be assessed by estimating a demand 
function for domestic money, the problem of disentangling whether foreign money is 
merely held for store of value purposes or is indeed replacing domestic money as 
vehicle for transactions is circumvented.  
Applying the test to six Latin American countries that imposed restrictions on 
capital flows for long periods of time, we found evidence of CS in Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic and Venezuela, ambiguous evidence in Paraguay and no 
evidence at all in Brazil and Chile. Comparing with existing estimates for the amount 
of foreign money holdings in these countries, we find consistency with the view that 
CS is more likely to occur when a considerable demand for foreign money for store 
of value reasons already exists.  
 
References 
Agénor, Pierre and Mohsin Khan (1996) ‘Foreign Currency Deposits and the demand 
for money in developing countries,’ Journal of Development Economics 50, 
101-118 
Alami, Tarik (2004) ‘Counter-argumentations on a comment of Tarik H. Alami's 
Currency Substitution vs. Dollarization: a portfolio balance model, Journal of 
Policy Modeling 23, 473-479,’ Journal of Policy Modeling 26, 117-122 
 29
 
Bergstrand, Jeffrey and Thomas Bundt (1990) ‘Currency substitution and monetary 
autonomy: the foreign demand for US deposits,’ Journal of International 
Money and Finance 9, 325-34 
Branson, William and Dale Henderson (1985) ‘The specification and influence of 
asset markets,’ in: Handbook of International Economics, Vol. II, ed. R. W. 
Jones and P. B. Kenen (Amsterdam: North Holland) 
Calvo, Guillermo and Carlos Rodríguez (1977) ‘A model of exchange rate 
determination under currency substitution and rational expectations,’ Journal of 
Political Economy 85, 617-24 
Calvo, Guillermo and Carlos Végh (1992) ‘Currency substitution in developing 
countries: An introduction,’ Revista de Análisis Económico, 7, 3-28 
Chang, Roberto (1994) ‘Endogenous currency substitution and inflationary finance, 
and welfare,’ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26, 903-916 
Cuddington, John (1983) ‘Currency Substitutability, Capital Mobility and Money 
Demand,’ Journal of International Money and Finance 2, 111-133 
Cuddington, John (1989) ‘Review of ‘Currency Substitution: Theory and Evidence 
from Latin America’ by V.A. Canto and G. Nickelburg, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 21, 267-271 
Engineer, Merwan (2000) ‘Currency transaction costs and competing fiat currencies,’ 
Journal of International Economics 52, 113-136 
Fasano-Filho, Ugo (1987) Currency substitution and liberalization: the case of 
Argentina (Aldeshot: Gower Publishing Co.) 
 30
 
Feige, Edgar, Michael Faulend, Velimir Sonje, and Vedran Sosic (2003) ‘Unofficial 
Dollarization in Latin America: Currency Substitution, Network Externalities, 
and Irreversibility,’ in The Dollarization Debate, ed. D. Salvatore, J. Dean, and 
T. Willett (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 46-71 
Giovannini, Aalberto and Bart Turtelboom (1994) ‘Currency Substitution,’ in The 
Handbook of International Macroeconomics, ed. Frederick Van Der Ploeg 
(Oxford: Blackwell), 390-436 
Guidotti, Pablo and Carlos Rodriguez (1992) ‘Dollarisation in Latin America: 
Gresham's Law in reverse?’ International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 39 (3), 
518-544 
Imrohoroglu, Selahattin (1994) ‘GMM Estimates of Currency Substitution between 
the Canadian Dollar and the US Dollar,’ Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 26 (3), 792-807 
Kamin, Steven and Neil Ericsson (2003) ‘Dollarisation in Post-hyperinflationary 
Argentina,’ Journal of International Money and Finance 22, 185-211 
Kareken, John and Neil Wallace (1981) ‘On the indeterminacy of equilibrium 
exchange rates,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 96, 207-22 
Krueger, Russel and Jiming Ha (1996) ‘Measurement of cocirculation of currencies,’ 
in The Macroeconomics of International Currencies: Theory, Policy and 
Evidence, ed. P. Mizen and E. Pentecost (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), 60-76. 
Krugman, Paul (1984) ‘The international role of the dollar: theory and prospect,’ in 
Exchange Rate in Theory and Practice, ed. J. F. Bilson and R.C. Martson 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 
 31
 
Lebre de Freitas, Miguel (2004) ‘The dynamics of Inflation and Currency 
Substitution in a Small Open Economy,’ Journal of International Money and 
Finance 23 (1), 133-142 
Lebre de Freitas, Miguel (2006) ‘Currency Substitution and Money Demand in 
Euroland,’ forthcoming in Atlantic Economic Journal, 34 (3), September. 
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo (2006) ‘Financial Dollarization: Evaluating the 
Consequences,’ forthcoming in Economic Policy. 
Miles, Marc (1978) ‘Currency Substitution, Flexible Exchange Rates, and Monetary 
Independence,’ American Economic Review 68, 428-436 
Mizen, Paul and Eric Pentecost (1994) ‘Evaluating the Empirical Evidence for 
Currency Substitution: A Case Study of the Demand for Sterling in Europe,’ 
The Economic Journal 104 (426), 1057-1069 
Quinn, Dennis (1997) ‘The Correlates of Change in International Financial 
Regulation,’ American Political Science Review 91 (September), 531-551 
Rheinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff (2004) ‘The Modern History of Exchange 
Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
CXIX(1), 1-48 
Rojas-Suárez, Liliana (1992) ‘Currency substitution and inflation in Peru,’ Revista de 
Análisis Económico 7(1), 151-176 
Rogers, John (1990) ‘Foreign Inflation Transmission under Flexible Exchange Rates 
and Currency Substitution,’ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 22 (9), 195-
208 
 32
 
Sahay, Ratna and Carlos Végh (1996) ‘Dollarisation in Transition Economies, 
Evidence and Policy Implications,’ in The Macroeconomics of International 
Currencies: Theory, Policy and Evidence, ed. P. Mizen and E. Pentecost 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), 193-224 
Savastano, Miguel (1996) ‘Dollarisation in Latin America: recent evidence and 
policy issues,’ in The Macroeconomics of International Currencies: Theory, 
Policy and Evidence, ed. P. Mizen and E. Pentecost (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar), 193-224 
Smith, Constance (1995) ‘Substitution, Income and Intertemporal Effects in 
Currency-Substitution Models,’ Review of International Economics 3 (1), 53-59 
Stock, James and Mark Watson (1993) ‘A simple estimator of cointegrating vectors 
in higher order integrated systems,’ Econometrica 61(4), 783-820 
Sturzenegger, Federico (1997) ‘Understanding the welfare implications of currency 
substitution,’ Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21, 391-416 
Thomas, Lee (1985) ‘Portfolio Theory and Currency Substitution,’ Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 17 (2), 347-357 
Uribe, Martín (1997) ‘Hysteresis in a simple model of currency substitution,’ Journal 
of Monetary Economics 40, 185-202 
Végh, Carlos (1989) ‘The optimal inflation tax in the presence of currency 
substitution,’ Journal of Monetary Economics 24, 139-146 
Whited, Hsin-hui (2004) ‘Comment on Currency Substitution vs. Dollarization: a 
portfolio balance model,’ Journal of Policy Modelling 26, 113-116 
 33
 
Lead Footnote: 
Both authors are members of NIPE. Earlier versions of this paper were presented in the 2004 Latin 
American meeting of the Econometric Society and in the 2003 meeting of The Latin American and 
Caribbean Economic Association. The authors acknowledge Richard C. Barnett and two anonymous 
referees for helpful comments, and Edgar Feige and Dennis Quinn for sharing very useful data. 
                                                 
1 The terminology follows Sahay and Végh (1996). Different meanings for the terms “currency 
substitution” and “dollarisation” are however common in the literature. For a survey, see Giovannini 
and Turtelbomm (1994). 
2 Recent theories have related imperfect means of payment substitutability to the existence of 
transaction costs on the use of foreign currency. This includes Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992), Chang 
(1994), Uribe (1997), Sturzenegger (1997) and Engineer (2000). 
3 Extending the model to the presence of a safe asset leads to a currency substitution problem that is 
embedded in the optimal portfolio choice between the safe asset and the risky assets (the Merton 
problem). This extension is available from the authors upon request.  
4 With such specification, asset demands will be neutral in respect to the domestic inflation rate. 
Thomas (1985) deflated domestic assets by the domestic price level and foreign assets by the foreign 
price level, and introduced uncertainty in the foreign inflation rate instead of on the exchange rate. 
Although the two specifications are equivalent for the purposes of our discussion, the one followed in 
this paper looks more useful to describe the case in which a foreign money can be used along with the 
domestic money as vehicle for transactions that take place in the domestic economy. 
5 An alternative specification would assume that money enters in the utility function. The two 
approaches become functionally equivalent if the utility function is weakly separable, as happens to be 
the case in most of the  CS literature. For a stochastic model with money in utility, currency 
substitution and complete bond markets, see Smith (1995). 
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6 As shown by Sahay and Végh (1996), and briefly reviewed in Section 3, in the case with complete 
bond markets, these conditions are sufficient to obtain sensible money demand functions.  In Section 
4, we show that, when bonds denominated in foreign currency are not freely available, further 
assumptions are needed to obtain unambiguous interest-rate elasticities.  
7 Conditions similar to (15) and (16) were first obtained by Miles (1978), in the context of the two-step 
monetary model of CS. In that approach, CS decisions are postulated to be separate from the choice 
among non-monetary assets. The proof that separability of CS decisions holds in the dynamic 
optimising model with complete bond markets is from Thomas (1985). 
8 Equations (18) and (19) are not in the reduced form because changes in the interest rates also impact 
on money demands through wealth effects. However, the aim of the exercise is to learn about money 
velocities, so as to obtain testable money demand functions.  
9 In the extreme case in which dollar bank notes provided no transaction services at all (that is, when 
0222 == vv ), then condition (16) would not hold in equality and the optimal demand for dollars 
would be zero. The demand for pesos, however, would still be as described by (18a). Note that, apart 
from this extreme case, the rise in the domestic interest rate leads to an increase in the proportion of 
money balances that is denominated in foreign currency, even in the absence of CS.  
10 The model may also be solved considering a non-negative restriction on foreign bond holdings, 
0≥b (that is, the individual is not allowed to borrow in foreign currency). When such restriction is 
binding, the sign of the inequality in (16a) is reversed. This means that the use of foreign money for 
transaction purposes (and the eventual level of CS) is constrained by the absence of hedging 
opportunities in the bond market. Although interesting at the theoretical level, this case is at odds with 
the observation that in high inflation countries, a large demand for foreign money is primarily held for 
store of value reasons.  
 35
 
                                                                                                                                           
11 If the consumer had no access to domestic bonds either, one would obtain an optimal portfolio rule 
similar to (17a), except that i would be replaced by - 1v  in the interest differential. Currency 
substitution in a world without bonds was first discussed in the context of the monetary model by 
Calvo and Rodrígues (1977), and is analysed in the context of the liquidity services model by Rojas-
Suarez (1992).  
12 Although several African countries have experimented capital/exchange controls and CS, data 
limitations are more serious in that region.  
13 Levy-Yeyati’s (2006) data on financial dollarisation covers Chile from 1976 to 2001. On average, 
during this period, foreign currency deposits in Chile where below 10 per cent of total deposits. 
14 In the case of Venezuela, the dummy variable based on the IMF AREAR is equal to one from 1984 
to 1998, meaning high restrictions on capital flows. Quinn (1997), in turn, assigns a grade of 3 in 
1997, meaning very little restrictions. Taking into account the two sources, we decided to restrict the 
period with capital/exchange controls in this country to 1984-1996. 
15 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) tests indicate that log(M/P) is stationary in Brazil, Chile and the Dominican Republic, and has 
a unit root in Paraguay and Venezuela. Results for Colombia are mixed, as a PP test rejects the null 
hypothesis of a unit root, but the ADF test does not, and the KPSS rejects the null hypothesis of 
stationarity. Unit root tests are available from the authors upon request. 
16 The constant term was excluded from estimations in the cases of the Dominican Republic and 
Venezuela, as it was never statistically significant when included.  
17 Whenever quarterly data on GDP was not available, it was estimated from annual data using the 
frequency conversion option “cubic match last” of Eviews 5.0. The money market rate (line 60B) is 
only available with a reasonable number of observations for Brazil and Paraguay. The time deposits 
rate (line 60L) was used instead in the cases of Chile and Dominican Republic. In Colombia and 
Venezuela, we used the discount rate (line 60). Since interest rate data starts in 1991 in the case of the 
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Dominican Republic, and in 1990 in the case of Paraguay, the previous values of these countries’ 
interest rate series were proxied by the 4-quarter change in the CPI (IMF-IFS, line 64X). Since Brazil 
faced two hyperinflations during the sample period, it has much greater variance of prices, interest 
rates and exchange rates than the other five countries. For that reason, in the estimations for Brazil, the 
interest rate and the expected depreciation rate are used in logs, and the exchange rate volatility is 
proxied by the coefficient of variation of the exchange rate (instead of the standard deviation). 
18 The results for the first stage estimations are shown in the Appendix. We followed a general to 
specific approach, in which, besides the explanatory variables of the base model, we include in the list 
of instruments: the current and lagged depreciation rates, the current and lagged inflation differentials, 
the current and lagged growth rates of monetary expansion, and the current and lagged percentage 
differences between official and parallel exchange rates (data on the latter is from Rheinhart and 
Rogoff, 2004). The variables that were not statistically significant were sequentially excluded until we 
reached a parsimonious model that maximized the SBIC. 
19 In order to control for an eventual Cagan effect in the money demand, the four-quarter change in the 
CPI (the homologous inflation rate) was included in the model. This inclusion did not change the 
results for the remaining explanatory variables nor our conclusions regarding the existence of 
Currency Substitution in the six countries under analysis.  
20 Uribe (1997) and Sturzenegger (1997) stress the role of network externalities in the use of money in 
shaping the relationship between the aggregate demand for foreign money and its acceptability as 
means of payment. In terms of our model, network externalities would be accounted for in a general 
equilibrium set-up by making the transactions technology (9)  depend on the aggregate stocks of 
domestic and foreign monies. To the extent that the size of the network cannot be influenced by 
individual decisions, however, the latter would be invariant in respect to that specification.  
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Figure 1: Unofficial Dollarisation in Latin America 
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Source: Figure 2.2 of Feige, et al. (2003).  
Notes: The data was kindly shared by Edgar Feige.  
The indexes are defined as follows: 
CSI = FCC / (FCC+LCC) 
FCC = Foreign currency (cash) in circulation outside banks 
LCC = Local currency (cash) in circulation outside banks 
ASI = FCD / (LCD+LTD+FCD) 
FCD = Foreign currency deposits held with domestic banks 
LCD = local checkable deposits 
LTD = local time and savings deposits 
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Table 1: Restrictions to Capital Movements in the Sample Countries 
 
 
Quinn (1997) Scale of 0-4 
 
(0 = totally restricted, 
4 = totally free) 
Dummy Variable based on 
IMF AREAR, Line E.2 
(0 = not restricted; 
1= restricted) 
Country Name Year Value Period Value 
Brazil 1973 1.5 - 0 
 1982 1.5 1966-1998 1 
 1988 1.5   
 1997 2   
Chile 1973 1.5 - 0 
 1982 1.5 1966-1998 1 
 1988 1.5   
 1997 2   
Colombia 1973 1.5 - 0 
 1982 1.5 1966-1995 1 
 1988 1.5   
 1997 3.5   
Dominican Republic 1973 1.5 - 0 
 1982 1 1966-1995 1 
 1988 2   
 1997 2.5   
Paraguay 1973 2.5 - 0 
 1982 1.5 1966-1995 1 
 1988 1.5   
 1997 4   
Venezuela 1973 3.5 1966-1983 0 
 1982 3 1984-1998 1 
 1988 2   
 1997 3   
Sources:  The data on Quinn’s (1997) classification and on the IMF dummy was 
kindly shared by Dennis Quinn. 
 
 39 
 
Table 2: Dynamic OLS results of money demand estimations 
 Brazil Chile Colombia 
Log (M1/P) Inflation 
Differential 
Current 
Depreciation 
2SLS Inflation 
Differential 
Current 
Depreciation 
2SLS Inflation 
Differential 
Current 
Depreciation 
2SLS 
Constant 0.741 
(2.16)** 
0.851 
(2.48)** 
0.829 
(1.69)* 
-3.106 
(-4.05)*** 
-3.524 
(-4.00)*** 
-2.880 
(-3.80)*** 
-0.437 
(-0.84) 
-0.721 
(-1.56) 
-0.764 
(-1.61) 
Log (Real GDP) 0.093 
(2.18)** 
0.066 
(2.30)** 
0.101 
(1.90)* 
0.473 
(4.91)*** 
0.539 
(5.27)*** 
0.448 
(4.64)*** 
0.240 
(4.13)*** 
0.379 
(6.11)*** 
0.377 
(5.92)*** 
Domestic Interest Rate -0.083 
(-4.41)*** 
-0.054 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.087 
(-1.91)* 
-0.002 
(-2.58)** 
-0.002 
(-3.27)*** 
-0.003 
(-3.42)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.04) 
-0.0007 
(-0.43) 
-0.0005 
(-0.32) 
US Treasury Bill Rate -0.004 
(-1.46) 
-0.002 
(-0.98) 
-0.006 
(-1.52) 
0.006 
(1.60) 
0.007 
(1.25) 
0.004 
(0.86) 
-0.002 
(-0.84) 
0.001 
(0.79) 
0.002 
(0.93) 
Expected Depreciation 0.024 
(1.57) 
0.004 
(0.38) 
0.032 
(1.01) 
-0.0008 
(-0.78) 
-0.0004 
(-0.87) 
0.0003 
(0.49) 
-0.001 
(-2.03)** 
-0.001 
(-3.35)*** 
-0.001 
(-3.02)*** 
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.039 
(0.43) 
0.055 
(0.63) 
0.017 
(0.10) 
-0.0004 
(-0.45) 
-0.002 
(-1.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.86) 
0.001 
(2.00)** 
0.002 
(2.73)*** 
0.002 
(2.43)** 
1st Quarter -0.269 
(-9.74)*** 
-0.263 
(-9.11)*** 
-0.264 
(-8.32)*** 
-0.124 
(-4.70)*** 
-0.142 
(-5.16)*** 
-0.127 
(-5.20)*** 
-0.120 
(-7.27)*** 
-0.099 
(-6.56)*** 
-0.100 
(-6.44)*** 
2nd Quarter -0.142 
(-5.22)*** 
-0.135 
(-4.99)*** 
-0.141 
(-5.18)*** 
-0.173 
(-7.30)*** 
-0.164 
(-5.56)*** 
-0.174 
(-7.87)*** 
-0.080 
(-5.71)*** 
-0.086 
(-8.29)*** 
-0.086 
(-7.65)*** 
3rd Quarter -0.176 
(-7.84)*** 
-0.178 
(-9.12)*** 
-0.181 
(-7.59)*** 
-0.170 
(-7.65)*** 
-0.188 
(-7.85)*** 
-0.175 
(-7.42)*** 
-0.113 
(-9.16)*** 
-0.108 
(-8.96)*** 
-0.103 
(-7.82)*** 
Log (M1/P) (-1) 0.818 
(14.30)*** 
0.824 
(14.57)*** 
0.793 
(9.73)*** 
0.476 
(5.14)*** 
0.393 
(4.58)*** 
0.495 
(4.67)*** 
0.524 
(6.36)*** 
0.212 
(2.03)** 
0.227 
(2.15)** 
# Observations 116 116 108 87 85 87 104 104 104 
Sample Period 1970-2000 1970-2000 1970-2000 1977-1998 1977-1998 1977-1998 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.92 0.94 0.93 
Notes: - OLS estimations using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance.  
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM tests always reject serial correlation of the residuals; 
- The proxy used for the expected depreciation rate is indicated in the column title; 
- The coefficients on the lags and leads of the first differences of real GDP, domestic interest rate, US Treasury Bill rate, expected 
depreciation and exchange rate volatility are not shown in order to economize space. 
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Table 2 (continued): Dynamic OLS results of money demand estimations 
 Dominican Republic Paraguay Venezuela 
Δ Log (M1/P) Inflation 
Differential 
Current 
Depreciation 
2SLS Inflation 
Differential 
Current 
Depreciation 
2SLS Inflation 
Differential 
Current 
Depreciation 
2SLS 
Constant    -2.593 
(-3.08)*** 
-3.347 
(-3.76)*** 
-3.375 
(-3.69)*** 
   
Log (Real GDP) 0.074 
(3.37)*** 
0.066 
(3.82)*** 
0.085 
(3.60)*** 
0.341 
(3.20)*** 
0.440 
(3.89)*** 
0.444 
(3.81)*** 
0.082 
(3.12)*** 
0.045 
(1.76)* 
0.047 
(1.69)* 
Domestic Interest Rate -0.0002 
(-0.32) 
-0.001 
(-2.88)*** 
-0.003 
(-6.10)*** 
0.0002 
(0.31) 
-0.001 
(-2.03)** 
-0.001 
(-2.00)** 
-0.002 
(-1.93)* 
-0.001 
(-1.18) 
-0.001 
(-1.24) 
US Treasury Bill Rate -0.001 
(-1.04) 
-0.0001 
(-0.07) 
-0.004 
(-1.38) 
-0.004 
(-1.77)* 
-0.007 
(-2.45)** 
-0.007 
(-2.44)** 
0.002 
(0.24) 
0.004 
(0.45) 
-0.003 
(0.41) 
Expected Depreciation -0.001 
(-4.40)*** 
-0.000001 
(-4.53)*** 
0.0001 
(1.08) 
-0.001 
(-4.83)*** 
0.000003 
(0.35) 
0.0001 
(0.36) 
-0.002 
(-3.87)*** 
-0.0003 
(-2.46)** 
-0.0003 
(-2.19)** 
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.074 
(3.67)*** 
0.044 
(3.43)*** 
0.106 
(4.79)*** 
0.0000002 
(0.02) 
-0.000007 
(-0.63) 
-0.000006 
(-0.51) 
0.001 
(5.05)*** 
0.001 
(1.90)* 
0.001 
(1.77)* 
1st Quarter -0.205 
(-14.3)*** 
-0.178 
(-12.4)*** 
-0.099 
(-3.90)*** 
-0.059 
(-3.56)*** 
-0.074 
(-4.10)*** 
-0.073 
(-4.09)*** 
-0.132 
(-3.34)*** 
-0.113 
(-2.58)** 
-0.113 
(-2.65)** 
2nd Quarter -0.127 
(-7.89)*** 
-0.090 
(-6.04)*** 
-0.017 
(-0.64) 
-0.019 
(-1.20) 
-0.007 
(-0.41) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.071 
(-1.84)* 
-0.072 
(-1.72* 
-0.072 
(-1.57) 
3rd Quarter -0.146 
(-9.65)*** 
-0.130 
(-8.39)*** 
-0.059 
(-2.26)** 
-0.088 
(-5.62)*** 
-0.085 
(-5.08)*** 
-0.082 
(-4.62)*** 
-0.094 
(-2.24)** 
-0.115 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.118 
(-3.18)*** 
Log (M1/P) (-1) 0.853 
(16.13)** 
0.868 
(21.35)*** 
0.817 
(14.76)*** 
0.698 
(7.47)*** 
0.610 
(6.09)*** 
0.605 
(5.72)*** 
0.842 
(13.64)*** 
0.911 
(15.19)*** 
0.907 
(14.68)*** 
# Observations 92 95 95 104 104 104 52 52 52 
Sample Period 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1984-1996 1984-1996 1984-1996 
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.96 0.55 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 
Notes: -  OLS and 2SLS estimations using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance; 
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM tests always reject serial correlation of the residuals; 
- The coefficients on the lags and leads of the first differences of real GDP, domestic interest rate, US Treasury Bill rate, expected 
depreciation and exchange rate volatility are not shown in order to economize space. 
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Appendix- First stage results of the 2SLS estimations 
Depreciation (+1) Brazil Chile Colombia Dominican 
Republic 
Paraguay Venezuela 
Constant -3.991 
(-1.70)* 
-235.55 
(-0.71) 
-47.813 
(-0.64) 
142.585 
(0.81) 
193.486 
(0.44) 
-15241.08 
(-1.54) 
Log (Real GDP) 0.158 
(0.34) 
48.290 
(1.01) 
3.077 
(0.46) 
-57.491 
(-1.82)* 
-24.634 
(-0.45) 
1322.368 
(1.60) 
National Interest 
Rate 
0.403 
(1.91)* 
-0.373 
(-0.60) 
0.076 
(0.30) 
-0.326 
(-1.42) 
0.750 
(1.12) 
1.640 
(0.88) 
US Treasury Bill 
Rate 
0.058 
(2.66)*** 
-0.526 
(-0.30) 
0.437 
(1.45) 
0.716 
(0.62) 
-0.474 
(-0.32) 
51.822 
(1.27) 
Exchange Rate 
Volatility 
0.639 
(0.80) 
-0.675 
(-1.01) 
-0.100 
(-1.08) 
1.308 
(0.26) 
-0.103 
(-1.60) 
-1.127 
(-2.61)** 
1st Quarter -0.366 
(-2.22)** 
5.334 
(0.57) 
0.082 
(0.05) 
25.657 
(1.96)* 
-7.355 
(-0.42) 
-27.527 
(-0.51) 
2nd Quarter -0.199 
(-1.00) 
24.688 
(2.42) 
-0.543 
(-0.24) 
23.726 
(2.28)** 
-25.134 
(-1.99)** 
-119.642 
(-2.14)** 
3rd Quarter -0.117 
(-0.75) 
6.796 
(0.75) 
1.874 
(1.12) 
25.315 
(2.50)** 
-19.070 
(-1.98)* 
-51.603 
(-1.24) 
Log (M1/P) (-1) 0.445 
(1.34) 
-74.869 
(-1.33) 
2.159 
(0.11) 
103.363 
(2.35)** 
40.568 
(0.77) 
58.638 
(0.45) 
Depreciation  0.388 
(2.72)*** 
0.930 
(6.78)*** 
-0.004 
(-3.91)*** 
0.503 
(3.81)*** 
0.752 
(2.42)** 
Depreciation (-1)  -0.235 
(-1.37) 
-0.168 
(-1.24) 
 -0.240 
(-2.73)*** 
 
Inflation 
Differential 
0.492 
(3.35)*** 
  
 
0.331 
(2.62)** 
 -2.160 
(-1.45) 
Inflation 
Differential (-1) 
  0.076 
(2.34)** 
   
% Difference 
between Official 
and Parallel 
0.003 
(1.66)* 
 0.164 
(3.07)*** 
  0.876 
(1.92)* 
Growth of M1    0.178 
(1.87)* 
  
# Observations 108 87 104 95 104 52 
Sample Period 1970-
2000 
1977-
1998 
1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1984-1996 
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.46 0.73 0.32 0.20 0.23 
Notes: - OLS estimations using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance; 
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis 
is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM tests always reject serial correlation 
of the residuals; 
- The coefficients on the lags and leads of the first differences of real GDP, 
domestic interest rate, US Treasury Bill rate expected depreciation and 
exchange rate volatility are not shown in order to economize space. 
 
